Using the technique of Wan and Davis, we give an existence theorem for a Nash equilibrium point in N-person non-zero sum stochastic jump differential games. lt is shown that if the Nash condition (generalized Isaacs condition) holds there is a Nash equilibrium point in feedback srrategies. We ertend the results to other solution concepts and discuss applications and extensions.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Uchidar the existence of Nash equilibrium points in stochastic differential games is looked at by using the technique of Davis and Variaya.2 h is an essential point of this technique that analogues of the time derivation of the gradient of the value function are constructed using a martingale method. Consequently, we can obtain the optimal value directly by optimizing the Hamiltonian at each point. In this paper we will give parallel results for stochastic jump differential games, using the technique of Wan and Davis.3 Keeping the notation close to that in Reference 3, we consider a jump process x, specifred under a basic probability measure P to which corresponds a pair of entities (4, X) called the local description of the process; A determines the rate of occurrence of jumps while X determines their positions. By using an indexed pair of Radon-Nikodym derivatives (a",0"), we achieve control of xr through mutually absolutely continuous transformation of the local descriptions from (4, X) to (4", X"). Neither the jump process nor the controls need to be Markovian.
The player i,i:1, ...,N, chooses a feedback control ui(t,.r) over the finite interval [0, ff ] . Together, these controls determine u(/,x):(ur(t,x),...,ilN(/,x)). Corresponding to this choice of control, player i incurs a cost of the form /,(u) : E,, I J: .,(s, a,, c,.:)
In Section 2 we give a mathematical formulation of the game and some related results. In Section 3 we prove the main theorem, while solution concepts other than Nash equilibrium are considered in Section 4. We devote Section 5 to applications and extensions. To get a measure P on (Q,,v-n), we assume that the {Sr I are independent with survivor , 
such that q(t, A) is a local martingale of ,\.
Controls
Eachplayer i,i:1,2,...,A/,caninfluencethe jumpprocessthroughacontrolu'1r,x;with values in a compact metric space U'. Definition 2.1. ui() is in the class of admissible controls '11i if ui is,it-predictable.
Remqrk. We could allow (/ito depend on ut = (tti,...,t.ti-t,Lti+rr..., u,,)but prefer the less general case for ease of notation. Remqrk. The conditions (ii) are unpleasantly strong. Obtaining our results without them is an important goal of future research. Given the results of Kabanov,4 it seems that his very different techniques may give existence without (ii). For now, we need these conditions to assure mutual absolute continuitv of all solution measures.
d P,, dP
We further define a" (t,<,.l) : a(1, u(/, u), u) and 0,, (t, a) : g(t, x,u(/, c.,r), r). There now exist, for each ke.z* and u€.,11, functions q[: or_rXR*-R and 0t: Qp-t x X x R+ -' R such that o" (t,r) : I at(ar_ t, t -Tt _r(a))It,< rr^ r, /rl ) .} ,u, rrl x X N (x' s' tt')P" (ds' dx) where p(t, A) is the compensation for p(r, A) under p,,.
Value functions
From the above, the value function for player i given u,(.) is the process {Wi,l given by 
where tl/ii(ur)l is an 1.i,, P,,|-martingale and {aii(u')} is a predictable increasing process with aib(u'):0. Nii (u') can then be written as
J(0,/l x x for some gi( Ll"'(p) rvhere q"(t, A): p(t, A)-p"(t, A). Based on this, we define the 'Hamiltonian'
EXISTE,NCE OF NASH EQUILIBRIUM
We start by giving the conventional defrnition:
Definitiott 3.1. u*: (uf,...,r,t') is a Nash equilibrium point if for each i
Jf fui*1 : J1@f, u'*) ( -/(r'1, ur*) for all L,i( ,lti
Remark. Elliott and Davist have looked at equilibria where u1(t,x) only can depend on u'(s,x), s ( /. While this seems to be a natural requirement, it is not the conventional Nash concept. Remark. Since rz,1 depends on both past and future values of ur*, the Nash condition is quite complicated and less innocuous than it first appears. Perhaps the dynamic programming methods of Reference 5 can improve on this.
Our main result is now: Theorem 3.1. If the Nash condition holds, thcre is a Nash equilibrium point.
Hi(t,u, co) : ci(t,u, o) * a(1, u, c,r) \ t,(t, -r, u'1/, <t),u) \(dx, r, cu)
JX
The idea is now to minimize this in a pointwise fashion.
Proof . We prove that the controls u,i above are optim al in '1/i given u'* for all i by following the proof in Reference 3 (theorem 4.2). By (2) Proof. Again proceeding as in the proof of theorem 3.1, we can prove that the u* and the \s above satisfy for each (t,r,u)€ [0, ?"r] x O x '11 I x;tt,{u*; q \;t/,{u) t€5 so there is no S and no u such that Ji(ui,-ys) < /i(u*) for all i e S, Il
APPLICATIONS AND EXTENSIONS
We will confine our discussion to social science applications. In this context, a prime example is matching games where players team up for longer or shorter periods and try to control the switching behaviour of each other. The present paper is motivated by a model in which firms use prices to influence the brand-sr,vitching behaviour of consumers.u Another class of examples, with very significant practical implications, can be found in research and development races between firms in cases where technology follows a jump process. An application on another level is the theory of incentive contracts in cases where a central player (a ntanager) looks for reward schemes which will induce other players (workers) to maximize the net output of a team production process of the jump category.
As is always the case, these and other examples pose the need for more powerful results. One promising avenue which might allow one to drop the conditions (ii) could be suggested by the technique of Kabanov.o Alternatively, the deterministic piecewise Markov processes of Vermest *uy be sufficiently general to help us in many applications. It should be quite easy to prove existence of equilibrium for games played with such processes. At the other end of the spectrum, the very general processes considered by Jacod and Prottert'' seem to have many potential applications (in fact, they were directly motivated by a variation of the brandswitching problem alluded to above). It should finally be pointed out that many applications suggest the desirability of a theory of competitive impulse control. Unfortunately, the author has been completely unsuccessful in his attempts to make progress in this direction. Perhaps the 'Dynkin' games of Reference l0 will be a good starting point.
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